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Abstract
On 14 March 2012, the Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) delivered its 
first judgment in the first completed trial in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Lubanga 
was found guilty as a co-perpetrator in the conscription and enlistment of children under the 
age of fifteen years and of using them to participate actively in hostilities. This article com-
ments on the significance of the ICC judgment in the Lubanga case. It argues that the judgment 
contributes to the development and improvement of the normative value of international 
criminal law. It is also argued that the Lubanga judgment may offer interesting insights on the 
socio-pedagogical role of international criminal justice. Indeed, it is observed that it contrib-
utes to strengthening the sense of accountability for recruiting and using child soldiers, by stig-
matising such acts as contrary to the fundamental values of the international community.
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1. Introduction
On 14 March 2012, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
handed down the judgment of over 600 pages (including the separate opinions) 
in its first competed trial, in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.1 Thomas 
Lubanga, founder of the Union des patriots congolais (UPC) and commander-
in-chief of its military wing, the Forces patriotiques pour la liberation du Congo 
(FPLC), was convicted of the war crime of conscripting and enlisting children 
under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hos tilities in 
conflicts not of an international character, as set out in Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of 
1) Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-
01/04-01/06-2842, TC, 14 March 2012 (hereinafter ‘Judgment’), available at: http://www.icc-cpi 
.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
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the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute). This first judgment in a com-
pleted trial was concluded nearly after ten years of activity of the ICC.
Following three years of hearings, the three-judge panel unanimously found 
Lubanga guilty of war crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). More specifically, Lubanga was held responsible as co-perpetrator in 
the conscription and enlistment of children under the age of fifteen years into 
the FPLC and of using them to participate actively in hostilities. Between early 
September 2002 and 13 August 2003, the UPC/FPLC, as an organised armed 
group, was involved in an internal armed conflict against the Armée Populaire 
Congolaise and other militias, as the Force de Résistance Patriotique in north-
eastern Ituri region.
Lubanga is the first international proceeding involving only child-soldiering 
crimes, and as such it offered a first interpretation of the main features charac-
terising these crimes. Beyond shedding light on the conscription, enlistment, 
and use of child soldiers—widespread and often underestimated criminal 
phenomena—it more generally provided early clarifications on both proce-
dural and substantive legal issues relevant to the international criminal justice 
system established by the Rome Statute. For instance, since the decision on 
the confirmation of charges,2 Lubanga offered also theoretical guidelines by 
which to delimit the different forms of participation under Article 25(3), par-
ticularly in distinguishing between principal and accessorial liability.
2. The Tortuous Path of the Lubanga Case
Despite its central relevance in developing and improving the normative value 
of international criminal law, this case has been subjected to several criticisms, 
particularly in relation to its length, as Lubanga spent seven years under deten-
tion before being convicted. In this respect, the verdict concludes a long and 
troubled judicial iter, characterised by strong tensions between the judges and 
the prosecutor, as demonstrated by two stays of proceedings imposed by the 
Trial Chamber. Judges were concerned of potential violations upon the right to 
fair trial as a result of both disclosure issues and the prosecution’s refusal to 
honour a Chamber’s order.
The trial was suspended the first time from 13 June to 18 November 2008, 
since the Prosecutor had not revealed all the exculpatory information, 
relying on confidentiality agreements with third organisations pursuant to 
2) Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-
01/06-803-tEN, PTC, 29 January 2007 (hereinafter ‘Decision on the Confirmation of Charges’).
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Article 54(3)(e) of the Statute.3 In this way, the prosecution prevented the 
judges from assessing whether and how the rights of the accused had been 
violated. The second stay of proceedings was imposed by the Trial Chamber 
between 8 July and 25 October 2010, as the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) had 
not complied with an order of the judges to disclose to the defence the identity 
of an intermediary who had assisted the prosecutor in contacting witnesses.4
Even the 2012 judgment reflects such frictions between the judges and the 
prosecution. Indeed, the Trial Chamber did not miss the opportunity to criti-
cise the prosecutor’s approach of delegating its investigative responsibilities to 
intermediaries who contacted a series of unreliable witnesses.5 This had a 
negative impact on the expeditiousness of the proceedings. Indeed, due to the 
lack of a proper supervision by the main (three) intermediaries, the Trial 
Chamber spent a long time in assessing the ‘inaccurate or dishonest’ evidence 
submitted by a large number of individuals. According to the Trial Chamber, 
‘the prosecution’s negligence in failing to verify and scrutinise this material 
sufficiently before it was introduced led to significant expenditure on the part 
of the Court’.6 Without intending to be exhaustive, this brief comment aims to 
offer a general overview of the main substantive issues arising from the judg-
ment in question.
3. The Legal Recharacterization of the Armed Conflict in Ituri
It should be noted that Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC sets out differ-
ent lists of war crimes depending on whether an armed conflict is interna-
tional or non-international. The Trial Chamber found that there was, beyond 
any reasonable doubt, a nexus between the acts committed by Lubanga and a 
non-international armed conflict.
In confirming the charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTCI) had found that 
there were substantial grounds to believe that the UPC/FLPC was involved in 
an international armed conflict in the Ituri region between July 2002 and 
3) Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Consequences of Non-disclosure of 
Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the 
Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference 
on 10 June 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, TC, 13 June 2008.
4) Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request 
for Variation of the Time- Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to 
Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, ICC-01/04-01/06-2517-Red, TC, 
8 July 2012.
5) Judgment, supra n. 1 at 482.
6) Ibid.
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2 June 2003,7 and in a non-international armed conflict between 2 June and 
December 2003.8 Referring to the International Court of Justice, in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda Judgment (19 December 2005),9 the 
PTCI had qualified the relevant armed conflict only in part as international on 
the basis of the direct involvement of the Uganda People’s Defence Force 
(UPDF) in the hostilities.10 It is worth reminding that since the 1990s the Ituri 
region and surrounding areas were scourged by an armed conflict between 
governmental and rebel forces, and among rebel forces inter se, with the 
involvement of third countries, such as Uganda and Rwanda.
Relying on regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, the Trial Chamber 
departed from the assessment of the PTCI by affirming that during the rele-
vant period the conflict was non-international in nature.11 This provision 
allows the Trial Chamber to change the legal characterization of the facts 
underlying the charges, ‘without exceeding the facts and circumstances 
described in the charges and any amendments to the charges’.
According to the Trial Chamber, two or more armed conflicts with a differ-
ent legal nature may in principle coexist in the same situation under investiga-
tion by the prosecutor.12 Where this happens, one must identify the conflict to 
which the accused’s act is linked and the manner in which this conflict must 
be qualified. With regard to the armed conflict in Ituri, the crux was to exam-
ine whether the presence of Ugandan or Rwandese forces on DRC territory 
internationalised the relevant conflict in which the UPC/FPLC was involved. 
In so doing, the Trial Chamber assessed whether the UPC/FPLC and other 
armed groups involved in the same hostilities were used as agents or ‘proxies’ 
for fighting between two or more States, particularly Uganda, Rwanda, or the 
DRC.13
The Trial Chamber did not exclude the possibility that there was a concur-
rent international armed conflict between Uganda and the DRC at the time of 
the events. This is demonstrated by the presence of Ugandan forces in the Ituri 
region, which had occupied some areas of Bunia, including the airport.14 
However, for the purpose of deciding on the charges against the accused, the 
Court found that the hostilities between the UPC/FPLC and other armed 
groups ‘did not result in two States opposing each other, whether directly or 
  7) Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 2 at 205-226.
  8) Ibid. at 227-236.
  9) Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda), 
Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, 175.
10) Ibid. at 212-217.
11) Judgment, supra n. 1 at 567.
12) Ibid. at 540.
13) Ibid. at 552.
14) Ibid. at 565.
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indirectly, during the time period relevant to the charges’.15 Therefore, accord-
ing to the Trial Chamber, despite the existence of an international conflict, the 
Lubanga armed group,16 which was not acting on behalf of any State, was fight-
ing in a protracted environment of violence where multiple non-state armed 
groups were involved.17 In order to establish when a non-governmental armed 
group acts on behalf of a State, consistently with the PTCI’s legal reasoning, the 
Trial Chamber adopted the so-called ‘overall control’ test.18 This means that a 
State exercises the required degree of control when it ‘has a role in organising, 
coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition 
to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that 
group’.19
With regard to the requirements of a non-international armed conflict, the 
Trial Chamber confirmed the approach followed by the PTCI. Indeed, pursu-
ant to Article 8(2)(f), the Trial Chamber provided that these requirements are 
met when there is a ‘protracted’ armed conflict between ‘organised armed 
groups’.20 These groups must have a sufficient degree of organisation, in order 
to enable them to carry out protracted armed violence. Therefore, unlike arti-
cle 1(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it is 
not necessary that the organised armed groups involved in the conflict are 
‘under responsible command’, nor that they ‘exercise such control over a part 
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations’.21
4. The Questionable Selection of Crimes
As to the specific conduct of Lubanga, the Prosecutor’s choice to confine the 
charges against him to the enlistment, recruitment, and use of child soldiers 
has been criticised by scholars and commentators. They rightly contented that 
the armed group under the accused’s command had allegedly committed 
other serious crimes in Ituri, including mass murder, rape, mutilation, and 
torture.22
15) Ibid.
16) Ibid. at 553, 561.
17) Ibid. at 563.
18) Ibid. at 540.
19) Ibid. at 541.
20) Ibid. at 536.
21) See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.
22) See inter alia, P. Clark, ‘In the Shadow of the Volcano: Democracy and Justice in Congo’, 
(Dissent, Winter 2007) 29, at 31, available at: <http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article= 724> 
accessed 30 April 2012.
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On 8 December 2009, the Appeals Chamber (AC) reversed the Trial 
Chamber’s decision,23 which, relying on regulation 55, had taken into account 
the possibility of re-characterizing the facts, in order to include also charges of 
inhumane treatment and/or cruel treatment and sexual slavery.24 According 
to the AC, ‘article 74(2) of the Statute confines the scope of regulation 55 to the 
facts and circumstances described in the charges and any amendment 
thereto’.25 In line with the AC, the majority (Judge Odio Benito dissenting) in 
the Lubanga verdict decided that ‘the Trial Chamber’s Article 74 Decision shall 
not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges and amend-
ments to them’.26 Therefore, the Trial Chamber excluded that a decision pursu-
ant to Article 74 can cover factual allegations potentially supporting sexual 
slavery, since they had not been included in the decision on the confirmation 
of charges.27
By contrast, in her dissenting opinion, Judge Odio-Benito, pointed out that 
the majority ‘seems to confuse the factual allegations of this case with the legal 
concept of the crime, which are independent’.28 In so doing, she proposed the 
inclusion of sexual violence within the legal concept of using child soldiers to 
participate actively in the hostilities, ‘regardless of the impediment of the 
Chamber to base its decision pursuant to article 74(2) of the Statute’.29 
According to the dissenting Judge, ‘sexual violence is an intrinsic element of 
the criminal conduct associated with forcing someone to actively participate 
in hostilities.30
Beyond the reasons provided by the majority, it may be observed how the 
approach followed by the dissenting Opinion would create a strong tension 
with the legality principle and the accused’s rights. Even adopting an extensive 
interpretation, it appears difficult to encompass sexual violence within the 
explicit or implicit meaning of the provision in question. The dissenting 
Opinion in Lubanga, by applying a criminal norm beyond its literal sense, 
appears to provide a paradigm characterized by a creative role of the judge. 
23) Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the 
Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, Decision giving notice to the 
parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in 
accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-01/04-01/06-2205, AC, 
8 December 2009.
24) See Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision giving notice to the parties and partici-
pants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with 
Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-01/04-01/06-2049, TC, 14 July 2009.
25) See Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra. n. 23, at 93.
26) Judgment, supra. n. 1 at 630.
27) Ibid.
28) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito, attached to the Judgment, 16.
29) Ibid. at 17.
30) Ibid. at 20.
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However, such a role would be inconsistent with Article 23(2) of the Statute, 
which explicitly establishes that ‘the definition of a crime shall be strictly con-
strued and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition 
shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted, or 
convicted (emphasis added).’ Notwithstanding the fact that the application of 
the legality principle differs in its international dimension from that recog-
nised in domestic justice systems, the Statute reduces this gap by both estab-
lishing the different expressions of the legality principle31 and by striving to 
define as precisely as possible the conduct that may constitute international 
crimes.32
5. Conscripting or Enlisting Children under the Age of Fifteen Years into 
Armed Forces or Using them to Participate Actively in Hostilities
With regard to the legal elements of child-soldiering, Article 8(2)(e)(vii) crimi-
nalises the conduct of ‘conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fif-
teen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities (emphasis added)’. An absolute prohibition of the recruitment and 
use of children under the age of 15 in hostilities was already enshrined in 
Article 4(3)(c) of the Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Convention. 
The Trial Chamber ruled that Article 8(2)(e)(vii) in question establishes three 
different offences, which constitute war crimes if they take place in the con-
text of, or are associated to, a non-international armed conflict.33 For the pur-
poses of the conscription and enlisting, it does not assume any relevance if 
subsequently the child actively participates, or not, in hostilities. Thus, the 
Trial Chamber rejected the defence’s submission that this conduct requires the 
integration of the child as a soldier to participate actively in hostilities.34
Consistent with the approach followed by the PTCI, the Trial Chamber dis-
tinguished between conscription and enlistment on the basis of the child’s 
consent. Indeed, both of these, according to the Trial Chamber, are forms of 
recruitment, but while conscription constitutes a coercive recruitment, enlist-
ment is of a voluntary nature.35 These offences are committed at the moment 
a child under the age of 15 is enrolled in, or joins an armed group, with or with-
out compulsion. In addition, they are continuous crimes, meaning that they 
31) See Articles 22, 23 and 24 of the Statute.
32) H Olasolo, ‘A Note on the Evolution of the Principle of Legality in International Criminal 
Law’ (2007) 18 (3-4) Criminal Law Forum 301, at 310.
33) Jugdment, supra n. 1 at 609.
34) Ibid.
35) Ibid. at 608.
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only end when the child reaches 15 years of age or leaves the force or group.36 
The Trial Chamber also dismissed the notion that the consent of a child to his 
or her recruitment provides the accused with a valid defence, but it may 
assume relevance only in relation to the determination of sentences or victim 
reparation. This is due to the fact that a girl or a boy under 15 years of age is 
unable to provide ‘genuine and informed consent when enlisting in an armed 
group or force’.37
With regard to the conduct of using child soldiers to participate actively in 
hostilities, the Trial Chamber held that the reference to the expression ‘to par-
ticipate actively’ covers a wider range of activities and roles than the expres-
sion ‘direct participation’ used by Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions.38 It follows that such an act includes both direct and indirect 
participation. According to the Trial Chamber, a key element in establishing if 
an indirect role falls within the scope of article 8(2)(e)(vii) is constituted by 
whether the support provided by the child to the combatants exposed him or 
her to real danger.39 In this regard, the child’s support and the level of conse-
quential risk represent the criteria which must be used on a case-by-case basis 
to assess whether the child had an active participation in hostilities.
6. Principal versus Accessorial Liability: the Theory of ‘Control over 
the Crime’
Turning to the assessment of individual criminal responsibility, Lubanga was 
held guilty as direct co-perpetrator pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) having commit-
ted war crimes jointly with other individuals. This provision provides the 
modes of liability of direct participation, co-perpetration, and indirect perpe-
tration. Confirming the approach followed by the PTC, the majority (Judge 
Fulford dissenting) applied the ‘control over the crime’ theory, in order to 
distinguish the commission of a crime as a principal under Article 25(3)(a), 
from accessorial liability under Article 25(3)(b)(c)(d).40 Unlike the Ad-Hoc 
Tribunals’ Statutes—which adopted a unitarian concept of perpetration—
article 25(3) establishes a differentiated system, providing different forms of 
participation. In this way, the Statute seeks to establish a fairer criminal justice 
system able to satisfy the requirements of the principles of culpability and 
legality.41
36) Ibid. at 618, 759.
37) Ibid. at 613.
38) Ibid. at 627-628.
39) Ibid.
40) Ibid. at 976-1018; Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 3 at 326-338.
41) See inter alia, S Manacorda and C Meloni, ‘Indirect Perpetration versus Joint Criminal 
Enterprise’ (2011) 9(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 159, 167; K Ambos, ‘The First 
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Beyond the possibility to draw a borderline between principals and acces-
sories to the crime, this theory allows one to extend principal liability to those 
individuals who, in spite of their absence from the scene of the crime, control 
or mastermind its commission, since they decide whether and how the offence 
will be committed. In order to prove that an individual is responsible as co-
perpetrator, the prosecutor has to demonstrate the existence of an agreement 
or common plan between two or more persons, and the essential contribution 
made by each co-perpetrator to the crime.42 As for the subjective elements, 
beyond the mens rea of the relevant crime, it is required that all co-perpetrators 
are mutually aware of, and mutually accept, the likelihood that implementing 
the common plan would result in the realization of the objective elements of 
the crime.43
In other words, the conduct of one co-perpetrator may be imputed to other 
co-perpetrators, even if he or she is not physically present at the scene of crime 
and does not actively partake in the execution of the crime. This is possible 
when the coordinated or collective commission of the crime is based on a 
common plan or agreement. While the ICTY case law requires that the contri-
bution by every single perpetrator to the joint criminal enterprise (JCE) must 
be substantial, the Trial Chamber in Lubanga provided a higher threshold, rul-
ing out that the contribution to the commission of the crime must be essential. 
This means that ‘co-perpetrators share control since each of them could ‘frus-
trate the commission of the crime by not carrying out his or her task’.44
7. Concluding Remarks
Although much will be written on the Lubanga case in the coming years, it will 
be nonetheless arduous to determine the extent to which this decision can 
effectively contribute to the prevention, recruitment and use of child soldiers. 
In the DRC, children are still systematically abducted and conscripted by 
armed groups, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army or the Democratic Forces for 
the Liberation of Rwanda.45 Bosco Ntaganda, subject to an ICC arrest warrant 
since 22 August 2006 on charges of recruiting and using child soldiers in Ituri, 
Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A comprehensive 
Analysis of the Legal Issues’ 35, available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2030751> accessed 29 April 2012.
42) Judgment, supra n. 1 at 1006.
43) Ibid. at 1007-1008.
44) Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 2 at 342.
45) Human Rights Watch, ‘ICC: Landmark Verdict a Warning to Rights Abusers’ (14 March 2012), 
available  at:  http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/14/icc-landmark-verdict-warning-rights 
-abusers accessed 30 April 2012.
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has not been surrendered to the ICC by the local authorities and moreover has 
been appointed General of the national army.46 The minimal probabilities to 
realise the threat of punishment as a consequence of the lack of coercive 
power by the ICC jeopardize its deterrent effect. Following Damaska’s reason-
ing ‘it would thus bear more than a whiff of paradox for courts to regard as 
paramount a goal the attainment of which escapes their endogenous powers, 
and depends entirely on outside agents over whom they have no control, and 
whose support may or may not be forthcoming.’47
Nevertheless, Lubanga, as well as the case law of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL),48 including the recently delivered judgement against Charles 
Taylor,49 may offer interesting insights on the socio-pedagogical role of inter-
national criminal justice.50 They may contribute to strengthening the sense of 
accountability for recruiting and using child soldiers, by stigmatising these 
conducts as contrary to the fundamental values of the international commu-
nity. Moreover, by defining and denouncing the criminal nature of heinous 
conduct, such as the conscription, enlistment, and use of child soldiers, these 
cases enhance the normative scope of international criminal law. Therefore, 
beyond the actual effect of the ICC’s decision on potential criminals, it is 
expected that the Lubanga judgment serves—toward the entire collectivity of 
States—an important pedagogical goal of social acknowledgment of the val-
ues protected by international criminal justice.
It is significant to note that the Lubanga judgment reinforces the enforce-
ment of international human right law, in particular the protection of the 
rights of the child. In this respect, it is pertinent to note that the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC),51 ratified by 193 States, requires State parties to 
‘take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the 
age of 15 years do not take a direct part in hostilities’.52 In addition, States par-
ties to the CRC are obliged to ‘refrain from recruiting any person who has not 
46) Human Rights, Watch, ‘DR Congo: Arrest Bosco Ntaganda for ICC Trial’ (13 April 2012), avail-
able  at:  http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/13/dr-congo-arrest-bosco-ntaganda-icc-trial 
accessed 29 April 2012.
47) M Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83(1) Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 329, at 345.
48) SCSL, Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, Judgment, AC, 28 May 2008; SCSL, Prosecutor v 
Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, AC, 22 February 2008; SCSL, 
Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, Judgment, TC, 26 April 2012.
49) Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, 26 April 2012, Judgment 
Summary is available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=86r0nQUtK08%3d 
&tabid=53.
50) MA Drumbl, ‘Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Decision sur la Confirmation des 
Charges. Case no. ICC-01/04-01/06’ (2007) 101 (4) American Journal of International Law 841 
at 846.
51) UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force 2 September 1990.
52) Ibid. Article 38(2).
 T. Mariniello / International Human Rights Law Review 1 (2012) 137–147 147
attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces’ in all kinds of armed 
conflict (‘armed conflicts which are relevant to the child’).53
Although Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute and Article 38 of the CRC 
belong to different legal fields, they share a common rationale: ‘children are 
particularly vulnerable and require privileged treatment in comparison with 
the rest of the civilian population’.54 They need, therefore, to be protected from 
the risks associated with armed conflicts in order to ensure their physical and 
psychological well-being, which may be affected by fatal or non-fatal injuries 
as well as by the trauma deriving from the recruitment activity. ‪In defining 
and elaborating upon the crime of enlistment, conscription, and use of child 
soldiers, the Lubanga case notably contributes to the clarification of the nor-
mative content of those human rights provisions protecting children below 
15 years from taking a direct part in hostilities. This process of cross-fertilisa-
tion between international criminal law and human rights law responds to a 
logic whereby the different areas of international law are closely intertwined 
and as such, should be coherently interpreted as parts of a whole.55
In sum, it is hoped that the message sent by the Lubanga judgment is now 
very clear: ‘conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into 
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities’56 
constitutes a gross violation of human rights. It is a war crime of concern to 
the international community as a whole even if this takes place in a non- 
international armed conflict. As such, it ‘must not go unpunished’.57
53) Ibid. Article 38(3).
54) ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 (1987), 1377 at marginal note 4544.
55) G Pinzauti, ‘The European Court of Human Rights' Incidental Application of International 
Criminal Law and Humanitarian Law: A Critical Discussion of Kononov v. Latvia’, (2008) 6 (5) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1043, at 1046.
56) Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(e)(vii).
57) Ibid. preamble, para. 4.
